

Approved For Release 2002/04/04 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001200070012-1

6 April 76

TO: Chief, PAID

SUBJECT: NSC Requirement

SECRET

BACKGROUND

[REDACTED] NIO/ME, alerted me concerning a matter raised today by the NSC Contingency Planning Group (chaired by Hyland) concerning the plethora of reports received in the past at the White House during periods of crisis. The current concern is related to the volatile situation in Lebanon and, should war break out, the management of intelligence reporting in order to preclude a heavy volume of raw, duplicative, and often conflicting reports deluging the White House.

PROBLEM

In essence, the problem is that of streamlining the intelligence reporting system such that exactly ONE (1) SITREP, representing the best judgments of the Intelligence Community, is provided to the senior policy/decision makers.

REQUIREMENT

On Monday, 12 April, [REDACTED] will attend another meeting of the NSC Contingency Planning Group at which time he has been charged with reporting on what efforts are being made to develop an effective streamlined intelligence reporting system for crisis situations. [REDACTED] has asked for IC Staff assistance in this, particularly since such a system would have world-wide application, not just Middle East. This request will be confirmed by memo.

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Prod. 5j

IC 75-1475

23 MAY 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: National Situation Report Test

1. Several of our post-mortems have shown that consumers are interested in receiving a single national situation report during periods of crisis in lieu of the overlapping reports now being prepared by individual agencies.

2. On 9 January 1975, USIB asked the IC Staff to conduct a feasibility study, which we did on 18 March. For the test:

- OCI/DDI acted as chairman;
- CIA, DIA, INR, and NSA participated;
- a six-hour period was used; and
- Indochina and Thailand were the venue.

3. Our test showed that it is possible to produce a national crisis report within the six-hour time frame. However, the test was not a success in terms of manpower savings and improved product. The principal shortcomings were both technical and bureaucratic.

--From a technical point of view, the current means of communicating between agencies is inadequate. Until CONTEXT is fully operational, we will not have the means to edit text between remote locations.

--Bureaucratic problems are potentially more serious. DIA strongly resisted the idea that the DCI's national crisis report should be produced at the CIA Operations Center.

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DIA argued that crises, particularly those with a strong military character, should be directed from the NMIC-- which would provide reports to the DCI--because of its superior communications and its link with those making US operating force decisions. DIA agreed to participate in the test only after it was clearly spelled out that its participation did not constitute agreement that the center for producing a national situation report should be at CIA.

4. I recommend that this project be shelved temporarily. Once CONTEXT is operational we should try again. We should first solve the technical communications problem. Once we prove that we can talk and edit text, we will be in a better position to tackle the bureaucratic problem.

5. I recommend that at the next USIB meeting you make a verbal comment along the following lines:

"At USIB's direction, the IC Staff has been testing the feasibility of producing a national situation report during periods of crisis. This test has run into a snag-- the principal problem being our present inability to communicate and adjust text at remote locations on a real-time basis. We therefore intend to delay further tests until CONTEXT is operational."

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Lieutenant General, USA
D/DCI/IC

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COMMENTS:

(SIGNATURE)

1-2+3

Do we want to try to get this on the USIB Agenda this week?

Given the suggested course of action - I doubt if this is ready for USIB. It should be in back of your mind however on your report on the ship matter.

How do you wish to proceed?

Let's move it to DCI for upcoming USIB 24 May or 1st week in June - (W)

ACTION OFFICE

SUSPENSE DATE

IC Staff received ___ cys -
furn offices circled.

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TOP AND BOTTOM

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SLIP

Executive Review

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	DATE	INITIALS
1 Director of Central Intelligence	5/27	
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3		
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ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
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Remarks:

OK
The real
test is the quality of the
sitings

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